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Background: Previous studies have documented strategies to promote off-label use of drugs using journal
publications and other means. Few studies have presented internal company communications that discussed
financial reasons for manipulating the scholarly record related to off-label indications. The objective of this study
was to build on previous studies to illustrate implementation of a publication strategy by the drug manufacturer for
four off-label uses of gabapentin (NeurontinW, Pfizer, Inc.): migraine prophylaxis, treatment of bipolar disorders,
neuropathic pain, and nociceptive pain.
Methods: We included in this study internal company documents, email correspondence, memoranda, study
protocols and reports that were made publicly available in 2008 as part of litigation brought by consumers and
health insurers against Pfizer for fraudulent sales practices in its marketing of gabapentin (see http://pacer.mad.
uscourts.gov/dc/cgi-bin/recentops.pl?filename=saris/pdf/ucl%20opinion.pdf for the Court’s findings).
We reviewed documents pertaining to 20 clinical trials, 12 of which were published. We categorized our
observations related to reporting biases and linked them with topics covered in internal documents, that is,
deciding what should and should not be published and how to spin the study findings (re-framing study results to
explain away unfavorable findings or to emphasize favorable findings); and where and when findings should be
published and by whom.
Results: We present extracts from internal company marketing assessments recommending that Pfizer and
Parke-Davis (Pfizer acquired Parke-Davis in 2000) adopt a publication strategy to conduct trials and disseminate trial
findings for unapproved uses rather than an indication strategy to obtain regulatory approval. We show internal
company email correspondence and documents revealing how publication content was influenced and spin was
applied; how the company selected where trial findings would be presented or published; how publication of
study results was delayed; and the role of ghost authorship.
Conclusions: Taken together, the extracts we present from internal company documents illustrate implementation
of a strategy at odds with unbiased study conduct and dissemination. Our findings suggest that Pfizer and
Parke-Davis’s publication strategy had the potential to distort the scientific literature, and thus misinform healthcare
decision-makers.* Correspondence: kdickers@jhsph.edu
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National agencies, including the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the United States (US) and the
European Medicines Agency (EMA) in Europe, regulate
the marketing of drugs and medical devices. In the US, a
drug may only be marketed legally after it receives FDA
approval. Once the drug has at least one FDA-approved
use, physicians may prescribe it for other unapproved
uses, based on their clinical judgment; this is referred to
as off-label use. In general, marketing of drugs for off-
label uses is illegal both in the US and Europe, although
regulation has changed over the years [1,2].
Pharmaceutical companies have used various strategies
within their legal rights to market drugs for off-label
uses [3]. For example, current FDA guidance states that
pharmaceutical companies may use peer-reviewed arti-
cles to disseminate evidence of a drug’s effectiveness for
off-label uses, as long as certain conditions are met [4].
Perhaps the most important of the conditions is that the
information disseminated must not be false or mislead-
ing [4]. However, there is no regulation that all research
findings must be published, and, therefore, a company
may choose to selectively disseminate favorable findings.
There is now ample evidence that selective reporting of
study results, based on the strength and direction of
findings (reporting biases), is widely practiced by the
pharmaceutical industry [5,6].
Gabapentin (NeurontinW, Pfizer, Inc.) was first approved
by the FDA for marketing in the US in 1993 as an adjunct-
ive therapy for epilepsy in adults. Subsequently, the drug
was approved for use as an adjunctive therapy for epilepsy
in children (2000) and for the management of postherpe-
tic neuralgia (2002). Gabapentin was initially marketed by
Warner-Lambert’s Parke-Davis division, which was later
acquired by Pfizer (thus, hereafter referred to as Pfizer
and Parke-Davis).
Shortly after gabapentin's initial FDA approval for use in
epilepsy, Pfizer and Parke-Davis conducted a series of
“marketing assessments” for several off-label uses of the
drug. The “marketing assessments” for each off-label indi-
cation provided a detailed analysis of the importance of
the clinical condition, current treatment alternatives, mar-
ket share commanded by each intervention, and a forecast
of financial profits associated with two alternatives that
were at the company’s disposal to market the drug for
each indication — either obtaining FDA approval for mar-
keting associated with a given indication (an indication
strategy) or adopting a publication strategy (these are the
terms used in the “marketing assessments”). The goal of
the publication strategy was to conduct clinical trials and
‘to disseminate the information as widely as possible
through the world’s medical literature’ [7].
To date, internal company documents related to gaba-
pentin have been made publicly available through twoseparate legal actions. Documents from a whistleblower-
initiated government lawsuit involving violation of off-
label marketing regulations, settled in 2004 (hereafter
referred to as the 2004 whistleblower litigation), have pre-
viously been described [8]. In addition, a large number of
previously undisclosed internal company documents were
made available through subsequent litigation, brought
by consumers and health insurers that paid for prescrip-
tions of gabapentin, involving allegations of fraud (In re
Neurontin Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, MDL
1629, Civil Action NO. 04-cv-10981-PBS, United States
District Court, District of Massachusetts) [9]. Documents
related to this litigation (hereafter referred to as the 2008
consumers and health insurers litigation) first became
publicly available in 2008. While internal company docu-
ments made available in the 2004 whistleblower litigation
and the 2008 consumers and health insurers litigation
contain overlapping and unique information, the 2008
documents contain considerably new information. Both
sources were used for research presented here and in a
previous study [10]. The documents covered by these
two lawsuits provided us with a unique longitudinal
view of company deliberations and decisions concerning
marketing of one of its drugs. We distilled the literally
thousands of pages of new and older information into
themes of interest to those who study clinical trial conduct
and integrity.
The objective of the current study was to describe the
implementation of a publication strategy for off-label
marketing of gabapentin, within the context of reporting
biases and spin of Pfizer and Parke-Davis’s clinical trial
findings, for four off-label uses: migraine prophylaxis,
treatment of bipolar disorders, neuropathic pain, and
nociceptive pain. We use snapshots of internal company
documents to illustrate our findings.
Methods
Source documents for this study were provided to the
senior author (KD) for preparation of an expert report
for the plaintiffs’ lawyers in 2008 as part of the litigation
brought by consumers and health insurers against Pfizer.
We included information about all trials sponsored by
Pfizer and Parke-Davis and documents relating to the four
off-label uses revealed by the company during the discov-
ery process that accompanied the litigation. Through
communications with counsel involved in the litigation,
Pfizer agreed to waive any confidentiality claims concern-
ing all documents examined as part of KD’s expert report.
In addition, we retrieved internal company documents
that were made publicly available in the Drug Industry
Documents Archive (DIDA; http://dida.library.ucsf.edu)
following the 2004 whistleblower litigation [8]. In general,
full versions of examples of internal company documents
shown in the Additional file 1 may be accessed from
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of the relevant page. We redacted the names of indi-
viduals in the internal company documents provided in
the Additional file 1 and excerpts shown in the manu-
script. In one case, however, we did not redact the indivi-
dual’s name since the company personnel referred to the
study using the individual’s (principal investigator’s) name
and not the study number.
We examined marketing assessments prepared by or
for the company for each of the four off-label uses of
gabapentin (migraine prophylaxis, treatment of bipolar
disorders, neuropathic pain, and nociceptive pain) to
identify discussion of a publication strategy as a possible
marketing option. We examined over 20,000 pages of
internal company communications, memos, and other
documents to identify the definition of a publication
strategy and details related to its implementation. We
also examined the documents for evidence of reporting
biases (dissemination of research findings influenced by
the nature and direction of results) within our sample of
clinical trials.
To identify reporting biases, we compared internal
company protocols and research reports with the main
publication, if one existed, for each study included in
our analysis. The internal company research reports
were prepared for or by Pfizer and Parke-Davis at the
end of each study and provide documentation of the
methods for the trial and results of analyses. Typically,
the internal company research reports also included as
appendices the study protocol and its amendments, the
analysis plan, and output from statistical analyses. We
selected one main publication for each study in the fol-
lowing order of priority: full-length publication, letter to
the editor, non-systematic review showing a pooled ana-
lysis of selected trials, and a conference abstract [10].
We assessed the documents for appearance of the follow-
ing reporting biases: (a) publication bias (that is, publish-
ing a study report based on strength and direction of
findings), (b) outcome reporting bias (that is, selective
reporting of outcomes based on the strength and direction
of findings), (c) location bias (that is, in this study, report-
ing in journals with lower or higher circulation, based on
findings), and (d) time lag bias (that is, timing of publica-
tion based on the strength and direction of findings)
[6,11]. Publication bias and outcome reporting bias in the
context of the documents we examined for this study have
been explicitly explored in a previous article and are not
discussed here [10].
In this study, we also examined control of what was
published, assessed the documents for evidence of ghost
authorship (that is, failure to report as an author indivi-
duals who have made a substantial contribution to the
study or the article) [12], and assessed spin of the study
findings. We considered spin to exist when we observedeither an explicit description of spinning study findings
in the internal company documents or a description in
the main publication that appeared to re-frame the study
results in order to explain away unfavorable findings or
to emphasize favorable findings. Our definition of spin
was derived from terminology used in internal company
documents and other research related to spin [13].
We obtained data on circulation of journals publishing
the main publication for studies from internal company
documents (dated November 28, 2001) for 10/12 trials
(see Additional file 1: Figure S9 for an example). For the
remaining two trials, we obtained the 2001 journal circu-
lation from other sources: in one case from the 2001
edition of the Ulrich’s Periodicals Directory [14], and in
the other through communication with the publisher.
To check for validity of the data retrieved from Ulrich’s,
we compared the circulations in the internal company
documents with those in Ulrich’s. In general, the journal
circulation data were comparable, though not identical.
We examined internal company research reports and
published reports for each clinical trial and considered
the direction of trial findings to be statistically significant
if the primary outcome(s) was reported to be statistically
significant or if the P value was less than 0.05. If more
than one primary outcome was described in the reports or
if there was no distinction between primary and secondary
outcomes, we selected the smallest P value favoring gaba-
pentin to determine statistical significance of findings in
the trial. To determine the time to publication for each
trial, we calculated the time in months between the date
issued written on the internal company research report
and the date of the published report. For estimating the
time to publication, we did not include trials where an in-
ternal company research report was not available (n= 2)
or where the date of issue was not available (n= 1).
In preparation for litigation and the jury trial, all
authors reviewed all documents utilized for this paper.
Assessments of reporting biases, spin, and journal circula-
tion were made by SV and KD and discrepancies in the
assessments between the two authors were resolved
through discussion and reference to the original docu-
ments. All authors discussed the findings and agreed upon
their interpretation.
We present narrative description of events, counts, and
snapshots to depict reporting biases and we illustrate our
findings from relevant internal company documents.
Results
We identified a total of 21 trials sponsored by Pfizer and
Parke-Davis (three trials each for migraine prophylaxis
and bipolar disorders, nine trials for neuropathic pain,
and six trials for nociceptive pain), of which 13 were
associated with a published report [15-27]. We excluded
one published trial of gabapentin for neuropathic pain
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related to this trial [18]. One trial each for migraine
prophylaxis and treatment of neuropathic pain and all 6
trials for nociceptive pain were never published [10].
Publication strategy
For each of the four off-label indications we included in
our study, a document titled ‘marketing assessment,’
designed to examine the financial impact of seeking
FDA approval for a new indication versus other methods
of increasing sales for the indication, preceded clinical
trials sponsored by Pfizer and Parke-Davis. Our examin-
ation of internal company ‘marketing assessments’ for
bipolar disorders and neuropathic pain revealed clear
recommendations to adopt a publication strategy as
opposed to an indication strategy, that is, conducting
trials with an aim to obtain FDA approval for the indica-
tion; this finding has been reported previously for these
two indications [8]. The ‘marketing assessment’ for
migraine prophylaxis, dated July 31, 1996, also recom-
mended a publication strategy (see Additional file 1:
Figure S1). Specifically, the recommendation was to ‘con-
duct only publication study(ies) in the U.S.,’ and in a man-
ner comparable to what was described for bipolar
disorders and neuropathic pain, to publish the results, ‘if
positive’. The migraine prophylaxis ‘marketing assessment’
also stated ‘an indication strategy cannot be justified since
an NDA (New Drug Application) filing would occur close
to patent expiration’ (Figure 1).
The ‘marketing assessment’ for nociceptive pain, dated
December 1998, recommends that no attempt to extend
the patent for gabapentin should be made, in part be-
cause the current focus was on development of a new
drug, pregabalin. The document describes that the pri-
mary objective of any new trials should be to demon-
strate efficacy and that data on secondary endpoints,
such as gastrointestinal tolerance, ‘would be for publica-
tion only’ (see Additional file 1: Figure S2).
Implementation of the publication strategy and biased
reporting
Controlling the message – what should be reported?
Internal company documents including correspondence
among company employees indicate that to achieve its
marketing goals, Pfizer and Parke-Davis appear to have
exerted control over the message delivered in published
clinical trial results. One approach to controlling the mes-
sage, that we previously reported, appears to have been
not reporting, or selectively reporting, negative trial find-
ings (publication bias and outcome reporting bias) [10].
A Neurontin Publications Subcommittee (NTN PSC)
was formed within Pfizer and Parke-Davis to implement
a publication plan. Minutes from meetings between the
NTN PSC and Medical Action Communications (MAC),a medical writing company, indicate that a list of key
messages, guiding the content of published reports
related to the trials of gabapentin for off-label indica-
tions, was developed based on a branding guide (referred
to in Figure 2 and in Additional file 1: Figure S3).
A standard operating procedure related to publication
of affiliate-driven manuscripts was identified in internal
company documents dated October 16, 2002, and it
sheds further light on the publication planning process
(see Figure 3). (The term affiliate in this context refers
to Pfizer’s foreign affiliates, that is, corporations related
to Pfizer by either shareholdings or other means of con-
trol, including subsidiary, parent, or sibling corpora-
tions). According to the internal company documents,
“affiliate-driven manuscripts” were written for Pfizer and
Parke-Davis by MAC and sent to the authors for ap-
proval. Each article was coordinated by a manuscript
team, consisting of representatives from the medical and
marketing divisions of the company. The documents
also indicate that all affiliate-driven manuscripts should
be forwarded to the NTN PSC for review. One of the
objectives of manuscripts being reviewed by the NTN
PSC was to ‘ensure that they are in-line with current prod-
uct messages and areas of interest’ (see Figure 3 and Add-
itional file 1: Figure S4).
Example of how Pfizer and Parke-Davis controlled
what should be reported – study 945–224 Negative
findings from Study 945–224 were documented in an in-
ternal company research report dated February 7, 2000.
A manuscript describing the study findings was first
submitted to Diabetic Medicine on March 11, 2002 and
after it was rejected, to Diabetologia on October 22,
2002. Peer reviewers for both journals expressed con-
cerns related to the methodological approach, inconsist-
ency of findings from Study 945–224 with findings from
other studies of gabapentin for neuropathic pain, as well
as company bias (see Additional file 1: Figure S5).
Before the negative reviews and rejection of the
manuscript describing findings from Study 945–224,
MAC drafted a review article dated November 11,
2001, titled ‘Gabapentin Dosing for Neuropathic Pain.’
The draft, accompanied by a document titled ‘Key mes-
sages included in this manuscript’, was sent to Pfizer (see
Additional file 1: Figure S6). The key messages related to
the article focused on: (1) highlighting the adverse event
profile for other medications used in neuropathic pain in
contrast to the ‘excellent safety and tolerability record of
gabapentin’ and (2) recommendations for dosing, up to
3,600 mg/day. The published version of the review, dated
January 2003, included data from Study 945–224 in a se-
lective, pooled analysis of data from five trials sponsored by
Pfizer and Parke-Davis, and claimed an overall benefit of
gabapentin for neuropathic pain [16]. The key messages
Figure 1 Publication strategy versus indication strategy. A publication strategy consisted of conducting clinical trials with an objective of
disseminating results and generating clinical use of the drug for an unapproved indication, as opposed to obtaining FDA approval for marketing
(that is, an indication strategy). The figure is a snapshot of a “marketing assessment” of gabapentin for migraine prophylaxis illustrating
recommendation of a publication strategy that consisted of conducting trials to disseminate results and generating clinical use of the drug for an
unapproved indication instead of obtaining FDA approval (that is, an indication strategy). Excerpted from Pfizer_JMarino_0001611 [28].
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in the review article. MAC’s contribution was not acknowl-
edged in the published article [16], a practice consistent
with the definition of ghost authorship.
Controlling the message – what should be reported?
Spin We identified spin in publications related to 8/12 trials
included in our analysis (see Figure 4 and Additional file 1:Figure 2 Key messages for inclusion in publications appeared to have
internal company minutes of meeting with Medical Action Communication
dated July 18, 2011. The document illustrates how “key messages” appeare
gabapentin. Excerpted from Pfizer_RGlanzmann_0044636 [29].Figure S7 and Additional file 1: Table S1). We classified
the following as spin: emphasis in the published report
on outcomes that were not specified in the study proto-
col (Study 879–201) [27]; conclusions that did not
match study findings described in the internal company
research report (Study 945–220) [22]; extensive ra-
tionale to explain away statistically non-significant
(unfavorable to the sponsor) findings (Study 945–209;been developed based on a branding guide. Excerpt from
s (MAC) and the Neurontin Publication Sub-committee (NTN PSC)
d to have been developed by MAC based on a branding guide for
Figure 3 All affiliate-driven manuscripts were to be reviewed by the Neurontin Publication Sub-committee to ensure the content was
consistent with current product messages. This figure shows an excerpt from an internal company document related to the Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP) for manuscripts from company affiliates, indicating objectives for review by the Neurontin Publication Sub-committee
(NTN PSC). Excerpted from Pfizer_LeslieTive_0091420 [30].
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clusion of treatment effectiveness from an uncontrolled
study (Study 945–250) [26]; emphasis on statistically sig-
nificant secondary outcomes despite negative findings
for the primary outcome (Study 945–271) [20]; and an
explicit description of an attempt to spin study findings (asFigure 4 Spinning Serpell - Excerpts from internal company emails ill
945–306. Excerpts from internal company emails illustrating the decision t
the first author of the trial publication corresponding to Study 945–306. Ex
Dr. Serpell’s, names and contact information of individuals have been redacdescribed in internal company emails) (Study 945–306)
[24].
Example of spin We identified internal company emails
related to Study 945–306 that discussed how the study
findings would be presented in a poster [32], using spinustrating decisions to spin presentation of findings from Study
o spin presentation of findings from Study 945–306. Dr. Serpell was
cerpted from MAC_0003664 [31] and MAC_0003665 [31]. Other than
ted by us such that only first initials can be seen.
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subject line for the email conversation was ‘spinning
Serpell’ (Dr. Serpell was the lead study investigator).
An excerpt from the email communications follows
(see Figure 4 and Additional file 1: Figure S7 and
Additional file 1: Table S1):
‘If Pfizer wants to use, present, and publish this
comparative data analysis in which 2 of 5 studies
compared make the overall picture look bad, how to
(sic) we make it sound better than it looks on the
graphs.’
Controlling the message – where should the results be
reported?
At the request of the NTN PSC, an extensive list of jour-
nals and scientific congresses was developed ‘for the Neu-
rontin publications plan’ (see Additional file 1: Figure S8).
Documents from a subsequent meeting of the NTN PSC,
dated November 28, 2001, illustrate the profiles developed
for 115 journals and 80 congresses across 11 medical
specialties (see Additional file 1: Figures S9 and Additional
file 1: Figure S10 and Additional file 1: Table S2). The
documents profiled the journals and congresses in exten-
sive detail, providing data on, for example, the types of
unsolicited manuscripts accepted by a journal, percent-
age of primary manuscript acceptance, time from accept-
ance to publication, total publication time, whether and
where the journal was indexed, impact factor, total circula-
tion, target audience, and the percent geographic distribu-
tion of the journal. In the case of congresses, the detailed
profiles included whether abstracts were accepted, satellite
symposia were permitted, the target audience, geographic
audience, total attendance, and the total professional
attendance.
Figure 5 illustrates the journal circulation, as listed
in the internal company documents, compared to statis-
tical significance of findings, for each published trial
included in our study. Trials with statistically significant
publication-specified primary outcomes were generally
published in journals that had higher circulations than
trials with publication-specified primary outcomes that
were not statistically significant. Three studies (945–220,
945–291, and 945–276) with statistically non-significant
findings for the protocol-specified primary outcome,
subsequently reported publication-specified primary
outcomes as statistically significant (inconsistent find-
ings) [10], were published in journals with moderate
circulations. That is, the size of journal circulation for
reports with inconsistent findings was generally be-
tween the circulation of journals publishing consist-
ently non-significant and consistently significant
findings. Decisions about journal for publication may
have been related to additional factors, such as thejournal’s own selection criteria. For example, internal
company documents related to peer review of Study
945–306, which was initially submitted to the BMJ
(circulation listed as 115,000), revealed that the reviewers
were concerned about ‘badging’ of the trial, in the context
of the company’s employees serving as authors on the pub-
lished report (see Additional file 1: Figure S11). Findings
from this study were subsequently published in the journal
Pain with a smaller circulation (listed as 7,660) [24].
Controlling the message - when should the results be
reported?
Several internal company documents illustrated that
personnel affiliated with the marketing division within
Pfizer and Parke-Davis may have influenced the timing
of publication of trial results. We present two examples
for trials testing the effectiveness of gabapentin for
neuropathic pain.
Example 1 of timing of publication Study 945–224
was an international multicenter trial that compared
three doses of gabapentin with placebo for the treatment
of painful diabetic neuropathy. The trial was conducted
between May 1998 and September 1999 and the internal
company research report was issued on February 7,
2000, indicating statistically non-significant findings for
the primary outcome. Internal company documents re-
veal that the decisions on whether and when to publish
this trial’s results appear to have been made by market-
ing personnel (See affiliation of personnel in email com-
munications shown in Additional file 1: Figure S12). It
appears that the goal of marketing personnel was to
publish the statistically significant results from two other
trials the company sponsored (Study 945–306 and a
study on postherpetic neuralgia that we did not include in
our analysis [33]) before the statistically non-significant
results from Study 945–224.
‘What is critical is that −224 is NOT submitted to any
publication until we know WHEN the 2 UK studies
are going to be published. This will allow us to ensure
that 224 is not published before the UK studies.’ [34]
The decision regarding publishing findings from Study
945–224 appears to have been driven by marketing con-
cerns, as illustrated by the following email communica-
tion by a Senior Marketing Manager:
‘By the way, C_______, from a MKT point of view we
are not interested at all in having this paper published
because it is negative!!! So don’t put this as a high
priority in your list. . ..’ [35]
‘In fact it will be great to have it published by the end
of 2004!!! Just for Pregabaline [sic] launch. . .’ [35]
Figure 5 Journal circulation of main publication, by statistical significance of primary outcomes in the internal company research
report and the published report. Each study is represented by a two-sided rectangular box which indicates the statistical significance of the
primary outcome according to (1) internal company documents (left side, protocol-defined primary outcome[s]) and (2) the main publication (right
side, publication-defined primary outcome[s]). The text to the right of the box represents the journal's circulation. Numerical superscript specifies the
reference number for the main publication of the study. NA - Not available. S - Primary outcome(s) statistically significant. NS - Primary outcome(s) not
statistically significant. a. Cannot compare statistical significance: Internal company research report was not available (Studies 945–250 and No study
number - Gorson). b. Cannot compare statistical significance: Statistical significance not reported for any publication-specified primary outcome(s)
(Study 879–201). c. Journal circulation obtained from Ulrich's Periodicals Directory. 2001 edition; Volume 3. Page 5018. Bowker, New York (Study
945–224). d. Journal circulation for 2001 obtained through communication with the publisher (Study 945–411).
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were eventually described, in 2003, within a non-systematic
review of other neuropathic pain trials [16]. The article
described briefly each of the five trials it included, tabu-
lated the mean change in pain scores for each comparison
group within each trial, described in the text the statistical
significance associated with the primary and secondary
outcomes in each trial, and provided in the text a pooled
analysis of all five trials. A detailed description of the
evolution of the decision to publish results from Study
945–224 is available elsewhere [36]. See Figure 6 for
excerpts from email conversations involving marketing
personnel affiliated with Pfizer and Parke-Davis illustrat-
ing decision-making regarding publication of findings
from Study 945–224.
Example 2 of timing of publication Study 945–271
(referred to in the internal company documents as ‘POPP’)
was a multicenter, crossover trial in Scandinavian countries
that compared gabapentin with placebo for postoperative
and post-traumatic neuralgia. The trial was conducted
between November 1998 and November 2001 and the
internal company research report was issued in March
2003, indicating statistically non-significant findings for the
primary outcome.
An internal company email conversation indicates that
Pfizer and Parke-Davis personnel were concerned aboutpublishing the statistically non-significant findings from
Study 945–271 shortly before or after publishing statisti-
cally non-significant findings from another trial, Study
945–224 (see Figure 7).
‘The manuscript for the negative DPN paper is
complete, and the first author is eager to see it
submitted. I assume that we would like to maximize
the time interval between the R_________ paper and
the POPP study.’
A different internal company email illustrates that al-
though the primary investigator for Study 945–271 was
keen on publishing the trial’s findings, the company
sought to wait until a sub-study associated with Study
945–271 was completed in order to ‘optimise timing be-
tween the release of the two studies’ (see Figure 7 and
Additional file 1: Figure S13). The findings from Study
945–271 were described in an internal company re-
search report dated March 2003, although internal com-
pany documents indicate that Pfizer was aware of the
statistically non-significant results from this trial at least
by September 2001. The results from Study 945–271
were reported in full in August 2008, more than five
years after the internal company research report, and
nearly seven years after the results were available to the
company [20,41].
Figure 6 Internal company emails illustrating decisions to delay publication of trial findings from Study 224 that were not statistically
significant. Excerpts from multiple internal company emails, chronologically arranged, illustrating the decision to delay publication of results
from Study 945–224 with statistically non-significant findings. Individuals’ names have been redacted by us such that only first initials can be
seen. Excerpted from Pfizer_LCastro_002679 [34], Pfizer_LCastro_002680 [34], Pfizer_LeslieTive_0020985 [37], Pfizer_LeslieTive_0020922 [38],
Pfizer_JMarino_0000809 [39], and FAL007964 [35].
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date of the internal company research report was observed
for two other trials where the protocol-specified primary
outcomes were not statistically significant per internal com-
pany documents (Studies 945–220 and 945–209) [22,23].
Controlling the message – who should report?
Ghost authorship Available internal company documents
for two of the 12 included studies indicate that professional
medical writers drafting the published reports were not ap-
propriately acknowledged. Internal company documents in-
dicate that personnel at MAC drafted and responded to the
peer reviewer comments regarding the non-systematic re-
view describing findings from five trials including Study 945–
224 [42]. But MAC’s contribution was not acknowledged in
the published report [16]. Similarly, the contribution of med-
ical writers at Synergy Medical to the published manuscript
for Study 945–306, described in internal company docu-
ments, was not acknowledged in the published report [24].
Discussion
Parke Davis and Pfizer’s decision to use a publication
strategy to market off-label uses of gabapentin wasrecognized by the courts in the 2004 whistleblower case,
and this decision was documented in the biomedical lit-
erature in 2006 by an expert witness and his colleagues
[8]. What is new in our study and in the 2008 consumers
and insurers litigation is the discovery that various forms
of reporting biases and spin were used in conjunction with
the publication strategy. We previously reported failure to
publish trials with statistically non-significant findings and
outcome reporting bias [10]. In this study we also
observed that publication occurred in journals with higher
or lower circulations related to statistical significance of
findings; delay in publishing statistically non-significant
findings; tailoring of publication content to reflect key
marketing messages; adding spin to scientific publications
such that conclusions favoring gabapentin were empha-
sized and conclusions that did not favor gabapentin were
explained away; and indicators of ghost authorship. Each
form of bias, and spin, on its own, could be seen as a rela-
tively minor issue. The value of our findings is in the over-
all picture that emerges from what appears to be the
simultaneous use of many forms of reporting bias and
spin, all within the context of a pharmaceutical company’s
publication strategy, implemented for marketing purposes.
Figure 7 Internal company emails illustrating decisions to delay publication of trial findings from Study 271 that were not statistically
significant. Excerpts from an internal company email illustrating decision to delay publication of results the ‘POPP’ study (Study 271 or Study
945–271) with statistically non-significant findings. Excerpted from Pfizer_LeslieTive_0076418 [40].
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examining longitudinally the initial company decision to
adopt a publication strategy for marketing gabapentin
and increasing sales, and the consequences of that deci-
sion in terms of publication. Our work also provides a
framework for distinguishing a publication plan from a
publication strategy. A publication plan is typically
employed by industry to manage publication of clinical
trial findings [43,44]. In contrast, a publication strategy
involves conducting clinical trials not for the purpose of
obtaining regulatory approval to market for a condition
but to publish the trial findings in order to market the
drug for off-label uses.
Our definition for spin extends work previously done
by others on this topic, which used only published litera-
ture and focused on trials with statistically non-significant
findings [13]. Our findings provide a more detailed eluci-
dation of strategies for spin, for example, emphasizing
favorable findings from outcomes not pre-specified in the
trial protocol or from statistically significant secondary
outcomes, reaching conclusions that are not consistent
with trial design or findings, using extensive rationale
to explain away unfavorable findings, and in the case
of one trial, explicitly describing attempts to spin trial
findings (see Figure 4 and Additional file 1: Figure S7
and Additional file 1: Table S1).
Our study has limitations. Our findings in this study
related to reporting biases are influenced by what weidentified in the internal company documents provided
through the legal discovery process. We include as
authors of this article all persons involved in this aspect
of the legal case, for transparency. We adopted a case
study approach, whereby we described the findings from
our observations instead of conducting a detailed, quali-
tative content analysis of the internal documents. We
included in our analysis all available internal company
documents. However, there may be other documents
that are unavailable to us that could provide additional
information regarding issues discussed in this article.
We did not examine pharmaceutical trials on other
topics or supported by other companies, nor did we
examine trials sponsored by not-for-profit entities. Thus,
we are unable to say that our findings are uniquely or
generally related to industry funding. Indeed, reporting
biases have been documented in trials sponsored by
both industry and not-for-profit entities [45,46]. We
did not conduct an exhaustive search for all conference
abstracts related to each included trial. Our choice of
the main publication for each trial may have affected our
observations on reporting biases. However, our criteria for
selecting the main publication were based on the pub-
lished report that provided the most information among
all available published reports of the trial. We cannot be
certain that the reporting biases and spin we observed are a
direct consequence of the discussion and actions reported
in the internal company documents we examined. We did
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off-label uses. Analyses presented as testimony in the 2008
consumers and health insurers litigation indicate that there
was a general rise in the number of prescriptions for gaba-
pentin over the time period covered by the publications
examined in our study [47], although it is not possible to
establish to what extent publications made an independent
contribution to this increase.
On its own, a goal to disseminate research findings via
the published literature is broadly applicable, whether the
investigators are in academia, industry, government, or
elsewhere. In the case of gabapentin, the internal company
documents illustrate that as part of implementation of the
publication strategy, the company’s marketing personnel
appear to have controlled many aspects of publication
and presentation of study results, including content
(see Figure 7). Although trial investigators outside the
company were frequently keen to publish study findings
(including situations when tests of gabapentin’s effective-
ness were not statistically significant), internal company
emails indicate that decisions about the content and tim-
ing of journal publication may have been strongly influ-
enced by the company’s marketing personnel.
Pharmaceutical companies have a strong financial
incentive to pursue off-label marketing because such
marketing can influence physicians’ prescribing practices
and, consequently, the companies’ profits. Indeed, pub-
lished reports of research studies play an important
role in marketing by pharmaceutical companies.
Documents released during litigation against Pfizer
and Parke-Davis describe ideas discussed during train-
ing sessions for medical liaisons within Parke-Davis
[48]:
‘Notice all the studies we talk about, nothing gets a
doc more interested in a drug than a study [48].’
Most clinical trials testing the effectiveness of drugs
are sponsored by two types of entities: the pharmaceut-
ical industry and not-for-profit organizations [49-51],
such as the National Institutes of Health in the U.S. The
primary motivation for conducting the trials is different
for the two entities. The for-profit pharmaceutical in-
dustry has a legal fiduciary responsibility to its share-
holders, with a corresponding goal of financial profit,
achieved either through marketing approval by the
FDA or through other marketing strategies. Not-for-
profit organizations and their research partners in
academia, on the other hand, generally conduct clin-
ical trials in the context of scientific inquiry. The
reporting biases we observed represent deliberate dis-
semination of promotional messages to market gaba-
pentin [52]. This is not a situation likely unique to
gabapentin and Pfizer and Parke-Davis [53-55]; rather,the opportunity to examine internal company docu-
ments has provided us with rare insight into industry
communication and practices regarding trials included
in our study.
The public relies on a regulatory approval system
designed to protect them from the marketing of ineffect-
ive and potentially harmful drugs. The public is assured
that for drugs approved by the FDA, an unbiased exam-
ination of safety and effectiveness for the approved indi-
cation has been conducted. There is no such system to
ensure the safety and effectiveness of a drug used off-
label. Because the FDA and public can typically access
only the published reports of trials sponsored by a com-
pany for off-label uses of a drug, they have to rely on the
published literature as a truthful and complete reposi-
tory of the trial findings. When trials are conducted
solely within a publication strategy framework, and the
strategy includes reporting findings in a biased manner
to further a company’s marketing goals, there is the po-
tential for the scientific record to be distorted.
In addition to standard criminal and civil penalties,
several other government policies are in place to hold
companies accountable for unethical, off-label marketing
practices and prevent future occurrences. Companies
that repeatedly conduct clinical trials as part of a publi-
cation strategy and intentionally engage in unethical and
biased reporting of trial findings could be suspended or
even debarred from doing business with the federal gov-
ernment so as ‘to protect the public interest’ and ensure
‘the integrity of Federal programs’ [56]. Suspension or
debarment should be a strong deterrent, because
pharmaceutical companies rely for large portions of their
revenue from these programs (for example, Medicare,
Medicaid) and the sums involved are often far larger
than the revenue earned by improperly marketing a
single drug. The government may also suspend or debar
individual corporate employees [57], making them un-
employable in the industry. This would potentially have
a deterrent effect on corporate insiders who are often
unaffected by the imposition of large corporate fines.
Additionally, under the Park Doctrine, the FDA has the
ability to bring misdemeanor charges against high-level
corporate officers who were in a position to have cor-
rected or prevented violation of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (that is, ‘responsible corporate officer’)
[58,59]. Vigorous application of the Park Doctrine would
target high-level officers who are normally harder to
prosecute and typically escape liability. Finally, where
the improper marketing poses a serious threat to public
health, the FDA could require companies to conduct a
corrective marketing campaign to fix the misimpression
the improper marketing created and formally disavow
the erroneous marketing messages the company previ-
ously delivered [60]. Corrective actions could be costly
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marketing.
Conclusions
Scientific journals are intended to serve as a reliable con-
duit of valid evidence required for healthcare decisions.
Evidence of a drug’s effectiveness for off-label indications
should be considered a public health commodity [4].
Therefore, if a clinical trial is conducted not to answer a
scientific question but to implement a publication strategy
or further a marketing goal, it should be disclosed to the
peer reviewers, journal editors, and explicitly described in
the manuscript. Such disclosure will encourage critical
assessment of potential reporting biases in manuscripts of
trials for which publication decisions are made by a com-
pany’s marketing personnel, based not on the advance-
ment of science but rather on a company’s marketing
interests. Other policy options such as mandating registra-
tion of all trials, making trial protocols publicly available,
and enabling access to trial data can help mitigate the
impact of biased reporting on the integrity of the scientific
record. Further research should address how frequently
pharmaceutical companies employ a publication strategy
as a basis for conducting clinical trials, examine the im-
pact of FDA guidance on drug companies’ marketing
practices involving the use of publications in medical jour-
nals, and quantify the impact of misrepresentation of
scientific facts on prescription behavior and on patient
outcomes.
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